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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
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v. : 
PHILIP EARL HOLLEN : 
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INTRODUCTION 
In refusing to allow an expert witness to express his opinion about the reliability of 
the eyewitness identifications, the trial judge misapprehended the law on the role of 
experts and on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications. In doing so, he abused his 
discretion. He similarly exceeded his discretion when he decided before trial, without 
even assessing the need for the expert testimony, to bar the expert from giving an opinion 
on the reliability of the identifications. 
The trial judge further erred in admitting the eyewitnesses5 identifications. 
Numerous factors interfered with the eyewitnesses' observations, including a disguise, 
fear, the presence of guns, repeated exposure to suggestion, and the fact that the 
identifications occurred two months after the crime. Because this case hinged entirely on 
the accuracy of the identifications, the trial judge's errors severely harmed the defense. 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING THE EXPERT'S OPINION BASED ON A 
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE LAW AND HIS REFUSAL 
TO CONSIDER THE NEED FOR EXERT TESTIMONY 
A. The Trial Judge Erred in Concluding that the 
Expert Could not Address the Reliability of 
Eyewitness Identification 
The trial judge erroneously concluded that the expert witness would invade the 
jury's province by addressing the reliability of the eyewitness identifications. This Court 
and the federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have plainly established that experts may offer an 
opinion "as to facts that, if found, would support a conclusion that the legal standard at 
issue was [or was not] satisfied." Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.. 112 
F.3d 1207,1212-1213 (D.C. Cir. 1997): see State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355,1363 (Utah 
1993) (experts may render opinion on "a factual issue to be determined by the jury."). In 
fact, this Court has consistently allowed expert opinions on factual matters that the jury 
must ultimately decide. State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58,1J41, 27 P.3d 1115 (medical examiner 
properly "applied" physical evidence to the facts in concluding death was a homicide); 
State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, ffl|13-14, 5 P.3d 642 (approving of opinion on mentally 
impaired person's cognitive capacity to fabricate); State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329,332 (Utah 
1991) (allowing opinion on whether fire had been intentionally set). 
The reliability of the eyewitness identifications below was a factual issue, not a 
legal conclusion, upon which the expert could offer an opinion. This Court recently ruled 
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that trial judges may properly admit expert testimony on the reliability of a specific 
eyewitness identification. In State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59, fW, 27 P.3d 1133, this 
Court held that the trial court properly excluded expert testimony on an eyewitness 
identification because the expert did not have knowledge about the specific facts of the 
case. Id. Specifically, the expert only intended to "lecture to the jury as to how they 
should judge the evidence." Id. at ^ [43. This Court reasoned that the trial court acted 
properly because the expert did not offer "'an opinion concerning whether any witness9 
identification was accurate.'" Id. at ^ J44 (quoting the trial court's ruling). 
In contrast, the expert in this case sought to offer the very type of opinion evidence 
that this Court endorsed in Butterfield. In particular, the expert was prepared to give "an 
opinion as to whether the process of identification in this case raises serious question as to 
it's reliability." R. 317: 216. The trial judge misapprehended the expert's and the jury's 
roles in excluding the expert's opinion. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59, ft4,27 P.3d 1133. 
The State attempts to justify the trial judge's decision by speculating that the judge 
excluded the expert's opinion for a variety of possible reasons. State's Brief at 9-15. The 
State proposes that the judge may have concluded that the expert might have confused the 
issues, delayed the case, or caused the jury to attach too much weight to the expert's 
testimony. State's Brief at 12-14. 
Mr. Hollen does not dispute that trial judges have such discretion. Nevertheless, 
the State's arguments are ineffectual. In the first place, because the State raises the 
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possible grounds for the trial judge's decision for the first time in this appeal, the State 
waived consideration of those issues. State v. HelmicL 2000 UT 70, ^ [8, 9 P.3d 164. 
Even if this Court could consider the State's claims, the record does not support 
that any of the listed grounds for exclusion ever factored into the trial judge's decision. 
The trial judge's cursory decision indicates that he believed that it was the jury's role to 
decide the reliability of eyewitness identifications: 
Q [defense counsel]: Based on all these factors and 
what you know about the case, Dr. Dodd, do you have an 
opinion as to whether the process of identification in this case 
raises serious question as to it's reliability? 
Mr. Shepherd [prosecutor]: I'm going to object to that, 
your Honor. I think these are matters the jury can decide. 
The Court: Objection is sustained. This is within the 
province of the jury, Counsel. 
R. 317: 216-17. 
The only other insight into the trial judge's decision occurred at the hearing on the 
motion for new trial, almost two years after the trial. There, in denying the motion, the 
trial judge expressed his personal contempt for the need for expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification: 
The Court: As I recall, we gave the so-called eye witness 
identification instruction, did we not? That two or three page 
piece of work from Zimmerman? From the Supreme Court? 
Ms. Stam: Yes. I think it was a unanimous decision. 
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The Court: I'm not prepared, Ms. Stam, at this time to 
reconsider a ruling during the course of trial. My thinking, I 
think that if it warrants appeal, and certainly in your judgment I 
suppose it does, they ought to get on about it. 
But at that time, and as of this time, even having learned 
quite a bit since then, I'm not persuaded we need to have 
someone come down and tell us that witnesses don't know what 
they see. So your request is denied as to the motion for a new 
trial. 
R. 318:4-5. 
Both of these rulings evince the trial judge's personal dislike for expert opinions on 
the reliability of eyewitness identification and his misunderstanding of the role of experts 
and the jury in assessing the accuracy of that evidence. But, the rulings do not mention 
any concern for avoiding confusion, waste of time, or attaching too much value to the 
expert's opinion as the State proposes. Because these matters were not at issue in this 
case, they served as no grounds for excluding the expert's opinion. At the very least, Mr. 
Hollen deserves the benefit of the doubt on discerning the trial judge's reasoning since the 
trial judge refused to allow defense counsel to raise her objections at trial. 
Given the trial judge's misunderstanding of the law, his decision "exceedfed] the 
limits of reasonability." Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. When trial judges exclude expert 
testimony based on "a misperception of the law," an abuse of discretion results. Walker v. 
Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 844 P.2d 335,343 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also Gawv. State. 
798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Here, the trial judge mistakenly assumed that 
the rules of evidence prevented experts from addressing the reliability of eyewitness 
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identification. That false belief exceeded the trial judge's discretion. 
The State cites several cases that it claims supports the trial judge's decision. But, 
those cases are premised on the now discredited assumption that expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification does not constitute scientific knowledge and that the weaknesses 
in eyewitness identification are a matter of common sense for the jury. United States v. 
Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 883-84 (8th Cir. 1996), cert, denied 519 U.S. 1141 (1997) (because 
eyewitness identification is not a specialized field of study, jury alone decides reliability); 
United State v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 924-25 (9th Cir.), cert, denied 513 U.S. 1029 (1994) 
(defendant failed to show expert eyewitness testimony constituted scientific knowledge); 
United States v. Purham. 725 F.2d 450, 454 (8th Cir. 1984) (expert testimony not needed 
because jurors understand intricacies of eyewitness identification); United States v. 
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding expert testimony on eyewitness 
identification unreliable and ruling that jury adequately appreciated the problems with that 
evidence). These holdings contradict current understanding and the present state of the 
law. Thus, they serve as no basis for justifying the trial judge's decision. 
B. The Trial Judge Further Abused His Discretion 
in Excluding the Expert's Opinion Based on His 
Misunderstanding of the Law and Research on 
Eyewitness Identification 
Aside from the trial judge's misapprehension of the law on the role of experts, his 
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misunderstanding of the science and the law on eyewitness identification and his contempt 
for that field of study constituted an abuse of discretion. Throughout the proceedings, the 
trial judge doubted the need for expert testimony and viewed the limitations of eyewitness 
identification as "common knowledge." R. 316: 9. Given the extensive law that holds 
directly to the contrary, the trial judge's false notions were an abuse of discretion. Walker, 
844 P.2d at 343; Gaw, 798 P.2d at 1134. 
The State contends that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion and that his 
personal views on eyewitness identification evidence did not amount to a 
misunderstanding of the law. State's Brief at 16-18. Admittedly, the trial judge allowed 
the expert to testify and he instructed the jury on the limitations of eyewitness 
identification. But, at every stage of the proceedings, he also belittled the research into 
eyewitness identification and he expressed doubt about the need for expert testimony. 
Thus, although the judge appears to have felt compelled to follow this Court's precedents 
on eyewitness identification evidence, he doubted its validity. 
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial judge eliminated any doubt that 
his personal views affected his decision to exclude the expert's opinion. There, he 
described this Court's opinion in State v. Long. 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), as a "piece of 
work." R. 318:4. The State conspicuously fails to mention this comment in its brief. The 
trial judge similarly stated that even though he had learned a lot about eyewitness 
identification evidence since the trial he still believed that the jury did not "need to have 
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someone come down and tell us that witnesses don't know what they see." R. 318: 5. 
Clearly, the trial judge's misapprehensions on eyewitness identification influenced his 
refusal to allow the expert to render an opinion. 
Further contrary to the State's protestations, an abuse of discretion also results 
when trial judges render decisions without considering all "pertinent facts." Kallas v. 
Kallas. 614 P.2d 641,646 (Utah 1980). This basic concept is not "tangential[]M or 
confusing as the State's claims. State's Brief at 15. Rather, a decision before trial to 
exclude an expert's opinion regardless of the state of the evidence and without knowing 
whether any need exists for that testimony certainly qualifies as an abuse of discretion. 
Judges properly exercise their discretion by making "fully informed" decisions, rather than 
deciding whether to exclude an expert's opinion even before any facts are presented at 
trial. Id at 646. 
C. Withholding the Expert's Opinion on the 
Central Issue in the Case Harmed the Defense 
Because this case hinged on the reliability of the eyewitness identifications, the 
exclusion of the expert's opinion harmed the defense. The State presented no evidence at 
all to link Mr. Hollen to the crime other than the eyewitness identification testimony. But, 
without the expert's opinion, the jury had no means of weighing the competing evidence 
on the identifications. The jurors only knew that despite numerous problems with the 
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eyewitness observations, four eyewitnesses had identified Mr. Hollen as the robber. Had 
the jury known that the expert concluded that the identifications were unreliable, it would 
have had an evidentiary basis for an acquittal. Instead, the jurors were forced to rely on 
the eyewitnesses' credibility and their stated beliefs in the accuracy of their identifications. 
Given jurors' unfamiliarity with eyewitness identification problems, they needed expert 
testimony to reconcile the competing evidence and to explain that the eyewitnesses were 
sincere but wrong. Without expert guidance on reliability, the jury reached the only 
reasonable conclusion it could in the absence of an expert's opinion. 
II. THE EYEWITNESSES' IDENTIFICATIONS WERE 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY UNRELIABLE 
The trial judge also erred in admitting the eyewitnesses' unreliable identifications. 
Significant problems plagued the eyewitnesses' perceptions. First, the heavy set robber's 
disguise seriously interfered with all of the eyewitnesses' observations. As Dr. Dodd 
explained, research has shown that "the concealment by disguise is particularly disruptive 
of the ability to remember" faces. R. 315:98. Additionally, all of the eyewitnesses' 
memories were influenced by the composite sketch of the disguised man. Further, the use 
of guns and an unusual disguise coupled with the presence of two assailants created 
significant distractions and divided the eyewitnesses' attention. And, the fact that the 
eyewitnesses did not identify the robbers until two months after the crime diminishes the 
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reliability of their memories. 
Each of the eyewitnesses also had a limited ability to perceive the disguised man. 
Oscar divided his attention throughout the encounter, experienced an extremely high 
degree of fear, identified Mr. Hollen in a suggestive photo array that included only three 
pictures that matched the assailant's description, took several minutes to identify Mr. 
Hollen's picture, believed beforehand that the disguised man's picture was included in the 
array, was informed by the police that he had picked the correct picture., and gave 
inconsistent reports about whether he had accurately identified Mr. Hollen. 
Likewise, Channing only saw the assailants clearly for 20 to 30 seconds while Dave 
Peterson fetched the key to the vault room. Initially, he was unaware that a robbery was 
taking place. Channing also experienced sufficient fear to cause him to cry. Two months 
later, he observed Mr. Hollen on television under highly suggestive circumstances. 
Channing also identified Mr. Hollen in a suggestive photo array after which the police 
violated identification procedure guidelines and confirmed the accuracy of his photo 
identification. Then, at the line-up and at subsequent court proceedings he was repeatedly 
exposed to Mr. Hollen. 
Lou suggestively learned from Channing that Mr. Hollen had been arrested. Even 
though Lou arguably had the best opportunity to observe the disguised man, he could not 
affirmatively identify Mr. Hollen at the line-up. Also at the line-up, Lou overheard 
victims from other robberies mention Mr. Hollen's alleged involvement in other crimes, 
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suggesting that Mr. Hollen was the perpetrator. Despite being in position to see the 
disguised man, Lou mistakenly believed that the other assailant wore the sweatshirt. 
Similar problems arose with Jill's testimony. She did not perceive thata robbery 
was occurring until well after the group entered the vault room and after she experienced 
prolonged confusion. Her only opportunity to view the disguised man occurred in the 
vault room when she was confused, experiencing a high level of fear, and was distracted 
by emptying the safe and observing the other victims being tied up. She had a poor 
memory of the disguised man's clothes because she consciously tried to suppress her 
memory of the crime. Suggestion also infected her line-up identification. Before viewing 
the line-up, Jill overheard the victims of the Million Dollar Saloon robbery discussing that 
crime. She also believed the disguised man would be in the line-up and she admitted that 
Mr. Hollen's appearance most closely matched her description of the assailant. 
These facts distinguish this case from State v. Ramkez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
Most notably, the identifications here occurred two months after the crime when memories 
had faded as opposed to less than an hour in Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 784. Suggestion also 
permeated the identifications. Although the witnesses in Ramirez identified that defendant 
at a suggestive show-up, the fact that the identification occurred within a short time after 
the crime outweighed the suggestiveness. Id. The identifications in this case were much 
more suggestive given the lengthy time gap, Channing's spotting Mr. Hollen under highly 
incriminating circumstances on television, the incriminating photo array that included only 
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three possible choices, and line-up procedures that violated Justice Department guidelines. 
National Institute for Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for 
Law Enforcement (1999). 
This Court also apparently was not aware in Ramirez of the potent effect a disguise 
has on eyewitness identification. Although this Court expressed concern in that case that 
the defendant wore a scarf over his face except his eyes, there was no evidence on the 
current research on altering a person's appearance. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782-84. As Dr. 
Dodd testified, alterations by use of a disguise have an "enormous influence" on 
witnesses' ability to encode a face. R. 317: 205,217. Had this Court known of this 
research, its decision may well have been different. 
This case is much more similar to the facts in State v. Maestas. 1999 UT 32, 984 
P.2d 376. The concerns this Court expressed in that case are equally relevant here. 
Specifically, the witnesses (1) had a limited opportunity to view the assailant; (2) divided 
their attention on the use of guns; (3) offered conflicting reports about the assailants' 
clothing; (4) experienced fear; and, (5) failed to agree on whether the defendant was the 
robber. Id at ^ [23-24, 29. Suggestion also infected both cases, including the 
eyewitnesses' learning that the defendant was accused of other crimes and their discussing 
their observations among each other. WL at lfl|23-24. The use of a disguise in both cases 
further connects them and weakens the reliability of the identifications. Id. at 1J23. 
Because the only evidence linking Mr. Hollen to the crime was the eyewitness 
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identification evidence, the erroneous admission of the eyewitnesses' testimony harmed 
the defense. The absence of evidence prevents the Sate from establishing harmlessness 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jaeger. 1999 UT 1, f30, 973 P.2d 404. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial judge prejudiced the defense in refusing to allow admissible 
expert testimony and in admitting unreliable eyewitness testimony, reversal and a remand 
for a new trial are required. 
SUBMITTED this A^ day of October, 2001. 
K£NTR.HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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